NOTES FOR DDCI

19 November 1964

- 1. The DCI has not done any MR's on his more important recent meetings. These have included sessions with the President, McNamara, and Clark Clifford. The DCI has said nothing to anyone about his session with Clifford which took place last night.
- 2. There has been one Meeting of the Principals concerning SVN. Bill Bundy and his Task Force were asked to go back and do a more concise paper proposing courses of action. These are to be ready for the Principals to look over this weekend and next week through a series of meetings winding up with sessions with Ambassador Taylor later next week, and a final meeting with the President on or about 1 December.
- 3. The Director today is attending a meeting with the President. It was originally booked to cover only the question of future Cuban reconnaissance. The President, however, reacted strongly to the Chalmers Roberts' article in the Post this morning critical of the President's imminent return to the Texas ranch, and so he let it be known that he wanted the meeting to cover South Vietnam, Congo and MLF, as well as Cuba. Attendes include Rusk, HeN, eTe.

We understand that at the meeting, DOD planned to argue strongly for building a missile installation at Cape Kennedy to permit intensive KH-4 and KH-7 coverage of Cuba. The Director planned to shoot this down on the basis of cost alone, and intended to argue strongly for his pet plan of flying into Cuban holes with the U-2 and an occasional total coverage flight by a SKYLARK. As of this writing, we do not know the upshot.

4. In his session with McNamara on Monday, McNamara showed great sensitivity to 11-3. A strongly written air defense estimate in his view would provide the USAF with a great bit of leverage and McNamara made the point, with which the DCI agreed, that there is no real evidence on which you can confidently estimate --strong or weak.

DCI inquired how SecDef felt about convening the Hyland Panel to consider the matter. McNamara was against this. He said that Panel findings always leaked. The DCI said the Panel didn't leak, USIB didn't leak, but that leaks always came out of the Pentagon. The subject was then dropped.

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	McNamara was greatly agitated by the latest MACV report indicating an upsurge in VietCong infiltration. The DCI picked up the ball and ran with it. He conferred with Rusk and brought the matter up at USIB, and last night an inter-agency group of three experts (our man is enplaned for	7 25X
	Saigon to look into this matter. The root question to be investigated is the hardness of the information that MACV has available. An estimate is one thing; a guess is another; and Smuthing furn yet	another.
	The DCI started to mention NRO problems to SedDef, but SecDef begged off on this subject until next month. He said he had been totally absorbed in the matter of cutting down U.S. military bases, shipyards, etc.	<i>></i>
25X1	They agreed that we would not go ahead with the SIGINT installation. In discussing this subject, McNamara said he was aware of John Bross' efforts and studies of SIGINT requirements and he gave his 100% support to Bross, particularly in this requirement study.	
	5. In his meeting with the President on Tuesday, which was tete-a-tete, DCI got approval for disseminating 11-8. Otherwise there is no word available to us on this meeting.	✓
	6. At the NRO ExCom meeting on Tuesday, the only thing the DCI has said is that the meeting concerned itself largely with OXCART problems, a shortage of engines, and DNRO's desire to start coordinating as closely as possible the use of drones and U-2's in the Far East.	
25X1	Items the DCI had intended to raise included OKCART vulnerability, and the dropping of a word which would set up a meeting between you and McMillan concerning the West Coast CORONA Program. We have no word on these subject that NRO, by carle, has now withdrawn its larlier careation the 7. Here are a few nuggets from issues of the President's Checklist during your absence:	25X1 s, yeipt
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	11. The President's Board has submitted a memorandum to the President dated, 14 October concerning the Gulf of Tonkin incident.	7 ^{25X1}
	They recommend to the President that the DCI conduct a study of Community performance in crisis situations, particularly with an eye toward establishing a "central evaluation mechanism, perhaps using the Watch Committee and NIC."	★ 25X1
	letter, Bundy gives the appropriate actions to DCI as Chairman of USIB and to SecDef.	
	12. An NSAM has now been issued by McGeorge Bundy on audio-surveillance and counter measures. It is largely as we had drafted it, but contains an inoffensive, exhortatory paragraph at the end which was apparently drafted by This, as you know, dissolves the NSC Committee and gives the ball to the DCI, operating with the advice and assistance of USIB.	1 •25X1
	13. Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn has written to the DCI making it official that he chairs a JCS Task Force, making a "comprehensive evaluation" of the DIA. Wellborn asks to see and confer with the DCI some time after 14 December.	9
	14. CORONA 1014 was launched last night and at the moment is performing well.	
	15. I am attaching some additional papers designed to bring you up to date on some other "exciting matters." They include:	25X1

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	c. An interesting bot of press gossip about high level positions in Washington.	
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	e. A press squib showing how someone in Saigon misread the script and blabbed all about the BLUE SPRINGS Program.	
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